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WHAT WE HAVE HERE IS A FAILURE TO 
COMMUNICATE: AN APPROACH FOR 
EVALUATING CREDIBILITY IN AMERICA’S 
MULTILINGUAL COURTROOMS 
Daniel J. Procaccini* 
Abstract: In the American justice system, the jury is the ultimate and ex-
clusive finder of fact. In particular, credibility determinations are sacro-
sanct, and no witness is permitted to “invade the province of the jury” by 
testifying as to another party’s credibility. This rule is strictly enforced de-
spite being thoroughly discredited by behavioral research on the ability of 
jurors to detect deception. In the modern multilingual courtroom, this 
rule places linguistic minorities at a distinct disadvantage. The communi-
cation gap between cultures is vast, and courtroom interpretation suffers 
from many well-documented inadequacies that can profoundly affect a 
fact-finder’s conclusions about a non-English speaker’s credibility. In 
other circumstances, when it is reliable and will assist the trier of fact, 
courts routinely admit expert testimony. This Note advocates for a similar 
solution: where non-English speaking parties or witnesses would other-
wise suffer prejudice, courts should abandon the “province of the jury” 
rule and allow expert testimony regarding a witness’ credibility. 
Introduction 
 On a summer night in July 1986, in the strawberry fields of Sandy, 
Oregon, someone murdered Ramiro Lopez Fidel by stabbing him twice 
in the chest.1 The series of events culminating in his death is unclear, 
but it began the previous evening with an argument during an unruly 
birthday party held at a nearby camp for migrant workers.2 Witnesses 
recall that around two o’clock in the morning, Lopez jumped into a car 
and “tore out” toward the strawberry fields; seven men followed him in 
“hot pursuit,” one of whom was an eighteen-year-old fruit picker named 
                                                                                                                      
* Senior Articles Editor, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2010–2011). 
1 See Peter Carlin, What Becomes of the Resurrected?, L.A. Times, Mar. 8, 1992 (Magazine), 
at 20; Barnes C. Ellis, With a Reasonable Doubt, Sunday Oregonian, Jul. 24, 1988, at A1. 
2 See Carlin, supra note 1; Ellis, supra note 1. According to an eyewitness to the chase, 
the scene was chaotic: “It was like watching ‘Miami Vice’ that night, it was crazy.” Ellis, 
supra note 1. 
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Santiago Ventura Morales.3 Around dawn, a farm hand discovered Lo-
pez’s body amid a grisly crime scene.4 That same day, seven men from 
the camp—including Ventura—were arrested and questioned by local 
police.5 The following morning, Ventura alone was accused of murder.6 
 The subsequent investigation and trial of Mr. Ventura illustrate 
how “linguistic and cultural differences can unfairly penalize immi-
grants thrust into the cauldron of the American justice system.”7 At the 
time of his arrest, Ventura did not speak English or Spanish, but rather 
Mixtec—an indigenous Indian tongue native to the province of Oax-
aca, Mexico.8 Nevertheless, to the extent that investigators and court 
personnel were aware of this language comprehension problem, they 
largely ignored it.9 During the trial, interpreters complained that Ven-
tura and several Mixtec witnesses were not speaking Spanish, but the 
court disregarded their concerns.10 In addition to a basic language bar-
rier, broader and more complex problems of verbal, cross-cultural 
communication pervaded the investigation and trial.11 For example, 
                                                                                                                      
3 See Carlin, supra note 1; Ellis, supra note 1. According to Ventura, he and the other 
men found Fidel’s vehicle abandoned. See Carlin, supra note 1. They slashed its tires, shot 
out its windshield, and set fire to the sedan. See id. Around 2:25 a.m., police officers re-
sponding to a report of the car fire stopped Ventura and his compatriots but merely con-
fiscated their weapons and allowed them to depart. See Carlin, supra note 1; Ellis, supra 
note 1. 
4 See Ellis, supra note 1. “Blood from the wounds extended in a pattern of blood that 
investigators said measured almost seven feet long and three feet wide.” Id. 
5 See Carlin, supra note 1; Ellis, supra note 1. 
6 See Carlin, supra note 1; Ellis, supra note 1. 
7 Paul J. DeMuniz, Introduction to Immigrants in Courts 3, 5 (Joanne I. Moore & 
Margaret E. Fisher eds., 1999). See generally Carlin, supra note 1; Ellis, supra note 1. Ventura 
was tried in the Circuit Court of Clackamas County, Oregon. See Oregon v. Ventura 
Morales, Nos. 86-630, CA A42459, 1988 Ore. App. LEXIS 1627, at *1 (Or. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 
1988) (affirming judgment below without opinion). Because there is no appellate record 
or published trial court opinion, this Note relies on several comprehensive accounts of the 
case in order to relate its facts. See DeMuniz, supra; Carlin, supra note 1; Ellis, supra note 1. 
8 See DeMuniz, supra note 7, at 3. 
9 See id.; Ellis, supra note 1. John Haviland, a linguistic anthropologist, examined Ven-
tura and concluded that he only “had a ‘market command’ of Spanish—enough to buy or 
sell vegetables in a marketplace.” Ellis, supra note 1. The Spanish-speaking police officer 
who interviewed Ventura dismissed this fact: “‘Just because a guy speaks a dialect doesn’t 
mean he can’t understand Spanish.’” Id. The Mixtec language is not a Spanish dialect, but 
rather a tongue related to a language once spoken by Native Americans. See id. 
10 See Lourdes de León, The Mixtecs’ Annual 3,000-Mile Journey, in Nosotros: The His-
panic People of Oregon: Essays and Recollections 119, 119 (Erasmo Gamboa & Caro-
lyn M. Buan eds., 1995). 
11 See DeMuniz, supra note 7, at 4–5. Here, the phrase “cross-cultural communication” 
refers specifically to misimpressions held by the police or jury resulting from perceptions 
of behavior or demeanor rooted in unfamiliar cultural norms. See Richard W. Cole & 
Laura Maslow-Armand, The Role of Counsel and the Courts in Addressing Foreign Language and 
 
2011] Evaluating Credibility in America’s Multilingual Courtrooms 165 
“the officer who initially questioned Ventura insisted that [his] lowered 
eyes during questioning were an obvious guilt reflex.”12 In Mixtec cul-
ture, however, lowered eyes are a sign of respect.13 Interpretation of 
such seemingly obvious mannerisms is considered a common element 
of a fact-finder’s credibility determinations and likely played an undue 
role in the trial’s outcome.14 
 Less than four months after his arrest, an Oregon jury found 
Santiago Ventura Morales guilty of murdering Ramiro Lopez Fidel.15 
When the verdict was announced, Ventura “threw himself against the 
defense table and let loose a wail so chilling and anguished that it even 
seemed to shock the judge.”16 Although it was a ten-day trial, this vis-
ceral protest marked the first and only time that the jury heard Ven-
tura’s voice.17 He received a sentence of life in prison.18 The verdict ig-
nited a national media frenzy, and Ventura’s defense counsel pressured 
the district attorney into reopening the investigation.19 Four years later, 
                                                                                                                      
Cultural Barriers at Different Stages of a Criminal Proceeding, 19 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 193, 196 
(1997). Courts have acknowledged the difficulties attending non-verbal, cross-cultural 
interpretation. See, e.g., Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 881, 897 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(Posner, J., dissenting) (“Reading the facial expressions or body language of a foreigner 
for signs of lying is not a skill that either we or [the trial judge] possess.”); Zhen Li Iao v. 
Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 2005) (suggesting that courts are insensitive to cross-
cultural demeanor evidence); Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614, 617 n.5 (9th Cir. 1992) (hold-
ing that counsel was ineffective when he failed to present evidence via expert testimony 
that could have explained his Chinese immigrant client’s apparent lack of emotion at trial 
as consistent with Chinese cultural expectations during sentencing in a death penalty 
case). 
12 See DeMuniz, supra note 7, at 4. “The Mixtec witnesses displayed a similar inability to 
look into the eyes of the deputy district attorney or judge when questioned. Jurors inter-
preted that characteristic and the witnesses’ linguistic problems as some sort of combined 
effort by Ventura and other Mixtecs to thwart the trial process.” Id. The Mixtecs gave an-
swers “with blank faces or wild non sequiturs” that caused at least one juror to comment, 
“‘They all acted kind of guilty.’” See Carlin, supra note 1. 
13 See DeMuniz, supra note 7, at 234 n.7. 
14 See id. at 4; Cole & Maslow-Armand, supra note 11, at 195–96; Joshua Karton, Lost in 
Translation: International Criminal Tribunals and the Legal Implications of Interpreted Testimony, 
41 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1, 29 (2008). Ventura’s demeanor certainly affected the investi-
gating officer, who stated that he “‘was convinced without a doubt that [Ventura] was 
guilty.’” See Carlin, supra note 1. 
15 DeMuniz, supra note 7, at 3; Carlin, supra note 1; Ellis, supra note 1. 
16 See Carlin, supra note 1. 
17 See DeMuniz, supra note 7, at 3; Carlin, supra note 1. 
18 See Ellis, supra note 1. 
19 See Carlin, supra note 1. The case garnered nationwide attention after several jurors 
publicly expressed serious doubts about the accuracy of their decision. See id.; Ellis, supra 
note 1. The reinvestigation of the case showed that the state’s forensic evidence was deeply 
flawed and clearly established that someone else at the camp had killed Lopez that night 
in 1986. See Carlin, supra note 1. Additionally, a previously unexamined witness in the case 
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in January 1991, armed with new evidence and the support of an out-
raged public, Ventura succeeded in having the jury’s verdict overturned 
by the trial court.20 
 The adversarial model employed by the American justice system 
presupposes that a fact-finder can reach a reasonable conclusion about 
the truth based upon the information presented at trial by opposing 
parties.21 As the Ventura case demonstrates, however, that goal is frus-
trated by the evolving linguistic demography of the United States.22 
Nearly twenty percent of the U.S. population over the age of five speaks 
a language other than English at home.23 Forty-four percent of that 
population speaks English “less than very well.”24 Minorities speaking a 
primary language other than English compose a “discouraging propor-
tion of offenders.”25 Thus, the demand for foreign language interpreta-
tion services has boomed in recent decades.26 In the modern multilin-
gual courtroom, interpreters are an essential tool for ensuring funda-
mental fairness at trial.27 Nevertheless, courtroom interpretation suffers 
                                                                                                                      
testified that he saw a second car chase Lopez into the field that night, and that a man 
named Herminio Luna Hernandez confessed to Lopez’s murder. See id. That night, Luna 
abandoned his family and fled. See id. 
20 See Carlin, supra note 1. The court found for Ventura in his suit for post-conviction 
relief because “no expert witnesses were called in his defense and because he had been 
denied his constitutional right to testify.” Id. The district attorney did not express a belief 
in Ventura’s innocence and implied that he would retry him if given the opportunity. See 
id. 
21 See Fed. R. Evid. 611(a); Miguel A. Méndez, Lawyers, Linguists, Story-Tellers, and Lim-
ited English-Speaking Witnesses, 27 N.M. L. Rev. 77, 78 (1997). 
22 See Méndez, supra note 21, at 78. See generally 2006-2008 American Community Survey 3-
Year Estimates: Language Spoken at Home, U.S. Census Bureau, http://factfinder.census.gov 
(follow “Origins and Language” hyperlink under “People”; then follow “Language Spoken 
at Home” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 20, 2011) [hereinafter American Community Survey]; 
Hyon B. Shin & Rosalind Bruno, U.S. Census Bureau, Language Use and English-Speaking 
Ability: 2000, at 3 (Oct. 2003), http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-29.pdf. 
23 See American Community Survey, supra note 22. 
24 See id. 
25 See Joan Bainbridge Safford, No Comprendo: The Non-English-Speaking Defendant and the 
Criminal Process, 68 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 15, 15 (1977). 
26 See Susan Berk-Seligson, The Bilingual Courtroom: Court Interpreters in 
the Judicial Process 1 (2d ed. 2002). Importantly, interpretation is a distinct subfield 
within translation. See Karton, supra note 14, at 17. As one scholar describes it, “The word 
translation refers to the transfer of thoughts and ideas from one language (the source 
language) into another (the target language), in either written or oral form. Interpreta-
tion, on the other hand, encompasses only oral communication . . . .” See id. (footnote 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
27 See United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 389 (2d. Cir. 1970). The 
U.S. Supreme Court has never decided the question of whether due process includes the 
right to an interpreter. See Michael B. Shulman, Note, No Hablo Inglés: Court Interpretation as 
a Major Obstacle to Fairness for Non-English Speaking Defendants, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 175, 183 
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from considerable, well-documented inadequacies.28 Errors relating to 
vocabulary, syntax, and dialects abound and can vary in magnitude 
from innocuous to severe.29 These inaccuracies may be compounded 
with “prejudicial misimpressions” of a party based upon his or her de-
meanor because he or she lacks a shared cultural consciousness with 
the fact-finder.30 Yet, reversals on appeal for interpretation errors alone 
are rarely successful.31 As one scholar strongly stated, “Any assumption 
that interpreted testimony in our courtrooms today is largely adequate 
and accurate is a fiction.”32 
 Misinterpretation and misapprehension can profoundly affect a 
fact-finder’s conclusions regarding the credibility of linguistic minori-
ties.33 In the American justice system, the jury serves as the “ultimate 
and exclusive finder of fact.”34 Consistent with that role, courts have 
applied an ancient doctrine that prohibits any witness from “invading 
the province of the jury.”35 This prohibition has been invoked at differ-
ent times regarding various types of evidence, but over time much of 
the jury’s “protected province” has arguably been eroded.36 Neverthe-
less, courts continue to apply this maxim vigorously in one particular 
                                                                                                                      
(1993). In the federal system, foreign language interpreters are guaranteed in criminal 
and civil cases under certain circumstances. See Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1827 
(2006). Most state courts recognize that non-English speaking criminal defendants have a 
right to an interpreter. See Berk-Seligson, supra note 26, at 241 (App. 1). 
28 See, e.g., Berk-Seligson, supra note 26, at 142–45; Karton, supra note 14, at 26–30; 
Cassandra L. McKeown & Michael G. Miller, Say What?: South Dakota’s Unsettling Indifference 
to Linguistic Minorities in the Courtroom, 54 S.D. L. Rev. 33, 41–51 (2009); Shulman, supra 
note 27, at 184–87. 
29 See Cole & Maslow-Armand, supra note 11, at 194; Marina Hsieh, “Language-Qual-
ifying” Juries to Exclude Bilingual Speakers, 66 Brook. L. Rev. 1181, 1189 (2001); Karton, su-
pra note 14, at 26–27. 
30 See Cole & Maslow-Armand, supra note 11, at 196. Examples of such nonlinguistic 
cues include the failure of a witness or defendant to maintain eye contact with an interro-
gator or fact-finder, speaking in an unusually soft or loud voice, appearing emotionless, or 
the excessive and exaggerated use hand gestures. See id. 
31 See Berk-Seligson, supra note 26, at 200. One such case was People v. Starling, in 
which an Illinois appellate court overturned an English-speaking criminal defendant’s 
conviction for robbery because a Spanish-speaking witness had testified, but neither the 
defendant nor any of the principal players in the trial understood Spanish. See 315 N.E.2d 
163, 168 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974). It was obvious that the interpreter inaccurately translated the 
questions posed by the attorney and the witness’ answers, and the defendant placed objec-
tions on the record. See id. 
32 Hsieh, supra note 29, at 1192. 
33 See Cole & Maslow-Armand, supra note 11, at 196; Karton, supra note 14, at 28. 
34 Ric Simmons, Conquering the Province of the Jury: Expert Testimony and the Professionaliza-
tion of Fact-Finding, 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1013, 1013 (2006). 
35 See id. at 1020. 
36 See id. at 1018–27. 
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area: judgments regarding witness credibility.37 Courts typically reason 
that the specific topic of witness credibility is so “inextricably inter-
twined” with the role of the fact-finder as to preclude any outside opin-
ions on the matter, including those of expert witnesses.38 Moreover, ap-
pellate courts typically review interpreter errors under the deferential 
abuse of discretion or plain error standards.39 
 The common law prohibition “rests on the premise that the jury is 
adequately equipped to assess a witness’s credibility,” which renders an 
expert’s testimony unnecessary.40 Despite its deep roots and consistent 
application, social science research shows that this long-standing judi-
cial assumption is unfounded.41 The liberal thrust of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence favors the admissibility of “all relevant evidence” and re-
laxes traditional barriers to opinion testimony.42 There is no consensus 
that the Rules prohibit one witness from commenting on the credibility 
of another.43 This is particularly true in the case of expert opinions, 
which are permitted if they are helpful to the trier of fact and based on 
“scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.”44 It is unrealistic 
to harbor the belief that the use of expert witnesses can completely 
overcome the problems associated with interpretation and cross-
cultural communication.45 Nonetheless, where the testimony of a lin-
guist or cultural expert could assist the jury in its fact-finding role, the 
                                                                                                                      
37 See Anne Bowen Poulin, Credibility: A Fair Subject for Expert Testimony?, 59 Fla. L. Rev. 
991, 1001 (2007); Simmons, supra note 34, at 1021, 1029. 
38 Simmons, supra note 34, at 1028. 
39 See Lynn W. Davis et al., The Changing Face of Justice: A Survey of Recent Cases Involving 
Courtroom Interpretation, 7 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 1, 7 (2004). Where there is a timely objec-
tion placed on the record, the abuse of discretion standard of review is typically employed. 
See id. Where there is no objection, the court utilizes the plain error standard. See id. “Re-
versals based on plain error are rarely granted.” Id. 
40 Poulin, supra note 37, at 1001. 
41 See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, A Lick of the Lips: The Validity of De-
meanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 Neb. L. Rev. 1157, 1200 (1993). 
42 See Fed. R. Evid. 401; see also Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 
(1988) (stating that the Federal Rules of Evidence adopted a “general approach of relax-
ing the traditional barriers to ‘opinion’ testimony”). 
43 See Poulin, supra note 37, at 997. Judge Weinstein once suggested that the Federal 
Rules of Evidence permitted expert witnesses to express opinions on another witness’ 
truthfulness. See 3 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence 
¶ 608[4] ( Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 1996). Professor Graham, however, disagrees with 
this interpretation of the opinion rules: he considers testimony about the character of a 
witness for truthfulness inadmissible. See Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal 
Evidence § 608.1, at 130 n.3 (5th ed. 2001). 
44 See Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
45 See Hsieh, supra note 29, at 1192. 
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testimony should be admitted at trial in order to preserve an individ-
ual’s right to a fundamentally fair judicial proceeding.46 
 This Note argues that courts should abandon their strict applica-
tion of the “province of the jury” rule and allow expert opinions regard-
ing a witness’ credibility where non-English speaking parties or witnesses 
might otherwise be prejudiced.47 Part I examines the linguistic demo-
graphics of the United States and the evolving composition of litigants 
in the American justice system. Part II briefly describes the right of trial 
participants to an interpreter and the mechanics of interpretation, and 
explores why the current system is insufficient. It describes the in-
adequacies of foreign language translation and their impact on a fact-
finder’s credibility determinations. Part III examines the nature of 
credibility determinations in the American justice system and summa-
rizes the federal law regarding opinion testimony at trial. Finally, this 
Note concludes in Part IV that the province of the jury rule regarding 
witness credibility is outmoded, and that where expert testimony would 
assist the trier of fact to assess the credibility of a linguistic minority at 
trial, it should be admitted. 
I. The Linguistic Demographics of the United States 
 John Jay’s statement in The Federalist, that Americans are “a people 
descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language,” is 
false.48 America has always been a nation of linguistic pluralism.49 Prior 
to the founding of the republic, the North American continent was a 
cacophony of more than one thousand different languages.50 Coloniza-
tion added Spanish, English, French, Dutch, and Swedish to the din.51 
In the early twentieth century, an influx of European immigrants in-
troduced the sounds of innumerable languages to the country’s chorus 
of voices.52 America’s embrace of multilingualism has been not only 
                                                                                                                      
46 Cole & Maslow-Armand, supra note 11, at 196; Karton, supra note 14, at 28; Poulin, 
supra note 37, at 1068; Simmons, supra note 34, at 1064–65. 
47 See Cole & Maslow-Armand, supra note 11, at 196; Karton, supra note 14, at 28; 
Poulin, supra note 37, at 1068; Simmons, supra note 34, at 1064–65. 
48 The Federalist No. 2, at 9 ( John Jay) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 
2001); see Roseann Dueñas González et al., Fundamentals of Court Interpretation: 
Theory, Policy and Practice 38–42 (1991); Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An 
Essay on American Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 269, 
273, 285 (1992). 
49 See Perea, supra note 48, at 273. 
50 See id. 
51 See id. at 274, 285. 
52 See id. at 274. 
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cultural, but also institutional.53 The Framers actively avoided declaring 
English to be the official language of the United States in the Constitu-
tion, and it was not until the nineteenth century that “English only” 
laws appeared.54 During the country’s infancy, a number of Founding 
Fathers as well as several states embraced the country’s linguistic diver-
sity.55 Thus, although the English language maintains a special promi-
nence in the United States, John Jay’s confident declaration that it is the 
language of the nation is, at best, misleading.56 
 Despite America’s long history of linguistic diversity, the nation’s 
demography illustrates the strain that multilingualism places on its ju-
dicial system.57 In 2008, at least fifty-four million people over the age of 
five spoke a language other than English at home.58 Over the last three 
decades, this population has increased dramatically.59 In 2008, forty-
four percent of those speaking another language at home spoke Eng-
lish “less than very well.”60 Therefore, at least twenty-four million peo-
ple would require translation services if they found themselves in 
court.61 Moreover, the burden of providing interpreters for linguistic 
                                                                                                                      
53 See id. at 309–28 (describing the “rich legal histor[y] of multilingualism” in the 
United States and the official recognition of multiple languages in Pennsylvania, Califor-
nia, New Mexico, and Louisiana, along with several other states). 
54 See González et al., supra note 48, at 38. The rise of the “English Only” movement 
is associated with the dramatic increase in the immigrant population at that time, which 
was met with intolerance for both foreign language and culture. See id. For example, in the 
late nineteenth century, Native American children were effectively prohibited from speak-
ing their indigenous languages and were forced to attend English language boarding 
schools. See Michael DiChiara, Note, A Modern Day Myth: The Necessity of English as the Official 
Language, 17 B.C. Third World L.J. 101, 103 (1997). 
55 See Perea, supra note 48, at 287–92 (comparing the views of Benjamin Franklin, 
Thomas Jefferson, and Benjamin Rush on multilingualism); supra note 53. 
56 See The Federalist, supra note 48, at 9; Perea, supra note 48, at 273, 276. The reality 
of linguistic diversity does not undercut the significance of the English language in the 
United States. See Perea, supra note 48, at 276 (“English is, without question, the dominant 
language of America and a key characteristic of America’s core culture.”). 
57 See American Community Survey, supra note 22; Shin & Bruno, supra note 22, at 3. 
58 See American Community Survey, supra note 22. 
59 See Shin & Bruno, supra note 22, at 4. In 1990, there were an estimated 31.8 million 
non-English speakers in the United States; in 2000, that number increased to 46.9 million. 
See id. In 2008, there were about fifty-five million non-English speakers in the United 
States. See American Community Survey, supra note 22. This rate is far higher than was pre-
dicted just twenty years ago. See González et al., supra note 48, at 21 (predicting that the 
number of limited- or non-English speaking individuals in the United States would reach 
fifty million by 2020). 
60 See American Community Survey, supra note 22. 
61 See id. Pursuant to the Court Interpreters Act, courts must employ interpreters 
whenever a party or witness “speak[s] only or primarily a language other than the English 
language.” See Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (2006); infra Part II.A.1. State 
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minorities is not equally distributed across the country: nearly one-third 
of all non-English speaking individuals live in the West.62 
 The variety of languages spoken in the United States constitutes an 
additional burden.63 As of 2009, Americans spoke approximately 364 dif-
ferent languages.64 Spanish is the most common non-English language 
spoken in the United States; thus, it is also the most frequently used in 
courtroom interpretation.65 However, there are at least nineteen distinct 
Spanish dialects.66 Currently, the U.S. federal courts certify interpreters 
in only three languages: Spanish, Navajo, and Haitian-Creole.67 
II. Courtroom Interpretation: Rights, Mechanics & Inadequacies 
A. The Right to an Interpreter 
1. The Federal System 
 The U.S. Supreme Court has never decided the question of 
whether a non-English speaking individual enjoys a right to a court-
room interpreter.68 Several Circuit Courts of Appeals, however, have 
ruled that criminal defendants may claim a right to an interpreter in 
                                                                                                                      
courts provide various standards for the appointment of interpreters. See Berk-Seligson, 
supra note 26, at 26–33; infra Part II.A.2. 
62 See Shin & Bruno, supra note 22, at 3–4. “The West region includes the states of 
Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, 
Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.” See id. at 3. The city of Hialeah, Florida, how-
ever, has the highest percentage of non-English speakers at almost ninety-three percent. 
See id. at 9. Nearly all of Hialeah’s residents speak Spanish, and almost sixty percent speak 
English “less than very well.” See id. 
63 See Ethnologue: Languages of the World (M. Paul Lewis ed., 16th ed. 2009), 
available at http://www.ethnologue.com/ethno_docs/distribution.asp?by=country. 
64 See id. 
65 See Berk-Seligson, supra note 26, at 3; Shin & Bruno, supra note 22, at 4. 
66 See Alexandre Rainof, How Best to Use an Interpreter in Court, 55 Cal. St. B.J. 196, 196–97 
(1980) (discussing the nineteen major Spanish dialects and providing various examples). 
67 See Three Categories of Interpreters, U.S. Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/Federal 
Courts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/DistrictCourts/CourtInterpreters.aspx (last vis-
ited Jan. 20, 2011). For Navajo, Haitian-Creole, and other languages, local federal district 
courts determine whether the interpreter has sufficient skills to serve on a case-by-case 
basis. See id. To become a certified federal court interpreter in Spanish, an individual must 
pass a two-part examination testing both written and oral skills across a wide variety of 
speech registers and vocabulary ranges. See Federal Court Interpreter Certification Examination 
(FCICE) Information, Nat’l Center for St. Cts, http://www.ncsconline.org/d_research/ 
fcice_exam/about.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2011). 
68 See Shulman, supra note 27, at 183. 
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connection with the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.69 
In the seminal case, United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, the Second 
Circuit held that, where a court is on notice of a criminal defendant’s 
inability to understand English, it is required to “make unmistakably 
clear to him that he has a right to have a competent translator assist 
him, at state expense if need be, throughout his trial.”70 Because Ne-
gron lacked the ability to comprehend the testimony of witnesses 
against him, his Confrontation Clause rights were violated.71 More im-
portantly for the court, he was constructively absent from his own trial 
because of his inability to consult with his attorney “with any reasonable 
degree of rational understanding.”72 
 Unsatisfied with the rulings of the judiciary, public pressure for a 
federal statutory right to an interpreter began to mount in the 1960s.73 
The desire for “equal access” to the justice system for linguistic minori-
ties was realized on October 28, 1978, when Congress passed the Court 
Interpreters Act (the “Act”).74 The Act requires the use of “qualified 
interpreters” in any criminal or civil action initiated by the United 
States if any party or witness “speaks only or primarily a language other 
than the English language . . . so as to inhibit such party’s comprehen-
sion of the proceedings or communication with counsel or the presid-
ing judicial officer, or so as to inhibit such witness’ comprehension of 
questions and the presentation of such testimony.”75 The benefits of the 
Act were threefold: (1) it mandated the use of interpreters in courts of 
                                                                                                                      
69 See, e.g., United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1973) (“The right to an in-
terpreter rests most fundamentally . . . on the notion that no defendant should face the 
Kafkaesque spectre of an incomprehensible ritual which may terminate in punishment.”); 
United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 389 (2d. Cir. 1970). 
70 See Negron, 434 F.2d at 391. Negron was an indigent, Spanish-speaking defendant ac-
cused of fatally stabbing his housemate during a drunken brawl. See id. at 387–88. 
71 See id. at 389. 
72 See id. The Court of Appeals strongly rebuked the trial court: 
Negron deserved more than to sit in total incomprehension as the trial pro-
ceeded. Particularly inappropriate in this nation where many languages are 
spoken is a callousness to the crippling language handicap of a newcomer to 
its shores, whose life and freedom the state by its criminal processes chooses 
to put in jeopardy. 
Id. at 390. 
73 See Berk-Seligson, supra note 26, at 1; González et al., supra note 48, at 41–42. 
74 See Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (2006). The passage of the act was “one 
seminal event [that] can be seen as the driving force behind the current growing trend 
toward greater use of court interpreting in American courtrooms . . . .” Berk-Seligson, 
supra note 26, at 1; see also González et al., supra note 48, at 60 (describing the “ripple 
effect” of the Court Interpreters Act throughout the states). 
75 See 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1). 
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the United States; (2) it appreciated the defendant’s need to compre-
hend the proceedings and assist in his or her defense; and (3) it recog-
nized the need for qualified interpreters, for which it established an 
objective certification program.76 “By passing this legislation, Congress 
affirmed the existence of inequality based on language, thus marking 
an important step in the history of political access rights based on lan-
guage remedies.”77 The Act was far from perfect, however, and has 
been criticized for its failure to articulate the necessary qualifications of 
interpreters and for its overreliance on judicial discretion.78 
2. State Court Systems 
 In the wake of the Court Interpreters Act, many states began ad-
dressing the issue of courtroom interpretation.79 California led the way 
in November 1974 by passing a constitutional amendment recognizing 
that criminal defendants unable to speak English possess a right to an 
interpreter.80 Constitutional amendments, however, are rare; most 
states guarantee some form of interpretive service either by statute or 
through administrative and judicial regulations.81 Today, in one way or 
another, most states recognize that non-English speaking criminal de-
fendants have a right to an interpreter.82 Despite advances, change has 
been slow: according to one study, court officials doubt “that they have 
the obligation to bridge the linguistic barrier faced by non-English 
speaking individuals” and, “having been required to nevertheless 
bridge that barrier, they have done so in a highly formalistic fashion, 
committing as little of their time, effort, and budget as possible . . . .”83 
                                                                                                                      
76 See González et al., supra note 48, at 57. 
77 Id. at 42. 
78 See id. at 61–63. 
79 See id. at 71. 
80 See Cal. Const. art. 1, § 14 (“A person unable to understand English who is charged 
with a crime has a right to an interpreter throughout the proceedings.”); González et 
al., supra note 48, at 73. Notably, New Mexico’s constitution has provided for court inter-
pretation since 1911. See N.M. Const. art. 2, § 14 (“In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall have the right . . . to have the charge and testimony interpreted to him in a 
language that he understands . . . .”); González et al., supra note 48, at 74. 
81 Berk-Seligson, supra note 26, at 27. 
82 Id. at 241 (App. 1); Shulman, supra note 27, at 178. 
83 See Carlos A. Astiz, But They Don’t Speak the Language: Achieving Quality Control of 
Translation in Criminal Courts, 25 Judges’ J. 32, 56 (Spring 1986). 
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B. Courtroom Interpretation Practices 
 Interpretation is “the transfer of meaning from a source language 
to a receptor or target language, [and] allows oral communication be-
tween two or more persons who do not speak the same language.”84 
The role of the courtroom interpreter is “to place the non-English 
speaker, as closely as is linguistically possible, in the same situation as an 
English speaker in a legal setting.”85 In the delivery of his or her ser-
vices, an interpreter is expected to refrain from providing defendants 
or witnesses with any unfair advantage.86 In practice, courtroom inter-
pretation occurs in one of three main ways: sight translation, simulta-
neous interpretation, and consecutive interpretation.87 The consecutive 
mode is preferable for in-court interpretation.88 In the course of this 
process, interpreters must practice “attending,” a concentrated form of 
listening that “requires a concerted effort to process the incoming mes-
sage.”89 In addition to these responsibilities, interpreters’ work must be 
speedy.90 Simply put, language interpretation is difficult.91 
                                                                                                                      
84 Elena M. de Jongh, Foreign Language Interpreters in the Courtroom: The Case for Linguis-
tic and Cultural Proficiency, 75 Modern Language J. 285, 288 (Autumn 1991). 
85 González et al., supra note 48, at 155. 
86 See id. at 155–56. Ironically, as the Ventura case demonstrates, witnesses and defen-
dants are more often than not disadvantaged by the use of a courtroom interpreter. See 
generally Carlin, supra note 1; Ellis, supra note 1. 
87 See de Jongh, supra note 84, at 288. There are significant differences between the 
three modes of interpretation. See González et al., supra note 48, at 163–66. One scholar 
compares them as follows: 
Sight translation is the oral rendition into the target language of material written 
in a source language . . . . Consecutive interpretation requires that that the source 
language speaker pause at regular intervals to allow the interpreter to convey 
the target language interpretation and is used for on-the-record testimony . . . . 
The simultaneous mode . . . demands that the interpreter listen and speak con-
currently with the primary speaker whose monologue is being translated. 
de Jongh, supra note 84, at 288. 
88 González et al., supra note 48, at 164–66. Consecutive interpretation allows for 
“thought-wholeness,” increased control, and may in some cases be more efficient. See id. at 
164. 
89 Karton, supra note 14, at 21. “The difference [between hearing and attending] is 
that hearing is a passive process involving an involuntary reaction of the senses and the 
nervous system, while listening is a voluntary, conscious effort to process the input selec-
tively. Attending is the most alert, deliberate form of listening.” González et al, supra 
note 48, at 380. 
90 See Karton, supra note 14, at 21. 
91 See Patricia Walther Griffin, Beyond State v. Diaz: How to Interpret “Access to Justice” for 
Non-English Speaking Defendants?, 5 Del. L. Rev. 131, 134 (2002); see also Shulman, supra note 
27, at 186 (“Foreign language interpretation is one of the most difficult tasks a human being 
can perform.”). 
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C. Interpreted Language: What’s Lost in Translation? 
 Courts have historically clung to the “conduit theory” of interpre-
tation, which “views the interpreter as a machine into which one lan-
guage enters and another language exits.”92 This theory is premised on 
a number of false assumptions.93 “It is a truism of linguistics that all 
language is inherently ambiguous.”94 Diversity of syntax and vocabulary 
provide a constant challenge for courtroom interpreters.95 Even in-
nocuous alterations in the formality of speech have a demonstrable 
impact on the perception of trial participants.96 Compounded with 
pure human error are the inevitable challenges posed by cross-cultural 
communication.97 Each of these factors significantly affects the ability 
of the trier of fact to assess the weight and credibility of particular tes-
timony.98 In Mr. Ventura’s case, these factors undeniably contributed to 
his wrongful conviction.99 
1. Tongue Tied: Vocabulary, Dialect, and Inaccurate Interpretation 
 The misinterpretation of words and idioms can easily prejudice a 
non-English speaking party in court.100 Neither the vocabularies nor syn-
tax of different languages are necessarily equivalent.101 Although em-
pirical studies are lacking, there is a substantial amount of dramatic an-
ecdotal evidence involving egregious misinterpretation.102 For example, 
in a New York federal court, a Cuban defendant stated over an under-
cover wire, “‘Hombre, ni tengo diez kilos!’”103 In light of its context and the 
defendant’s native dialect, the term “kilo” should have been interpreted 
                                                                                                                      
92 McKeown & Miller, supra note 28, at 41. 
93 See id. at 42 (“The presumption that linguistic accuracy is sufficient to properly con-
vey meaning has been soundly rejected by linguists and communication scholars.”). 
94 See Muneer I. Ahmad, Interpreting Communities: Lawyering Across Language Difference, 
54 UCLA L. Rev. 999, 1032 (2007). 
95 Karton, supra note 14, at 26. 
96 See id. at 27–29. 
97 See Ahmad, supra note 94, at 1033; de Jongh, supra note 84, at 290–92. 
98 See Karton, supra note 14, at 26–27; Hsieh, supra note 29, at 1189. 
99 See Carlin, supra note 1. 
100 See Berk-Seligson, supra note 26, at 118; Cole & Maslow-Armand, supra note 11, at 
195–96. 
101 See Karton, supra note 14, at 26–27. The term syntax denotes “the arrangement of 
word forms to show their mutual relationship in a sentence.” Webster’s Third New In-
ternational Dictionary of the English Language 2321 (Philip Babcock Grove ed., 
1986). 
102 See Hsieh, supra note 29, at 1189. 
103 See Shulman, supra note 27, at 176; Alain Sanders et al., Libertad and Justicia for All, 
Time, May 29, 1989, at 65. 
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to mean a form of Cuban currency, or in English, “cents.”104 Instead, the 
phrase was mistakenly interpreted as, “‘Man, I don’t even have ten ki-
los,’” where “kilo” referred to kilograms of drugs.105 Similar errors 
abound.106 
 Even more subtle forms of misinterpretation can significantly af-
fect a fact-finder’s evaluation of the evidence.107 In one study, 551 mock 
jurors, nearly forty percent of whom were Hispanic and spoke Spanish, 
heard recordings of testimony by a Spanish-speaking witness.108 One 
group of jurors heard a recording in which the interpreter would use 
“politeness markers.”109 For example, the interpreter would render “sí, 
señor” using the polite address form “yes, sir.”110 In the recording heard 
by the other group, the interpreter would simply render the witness’ 
response as “yes.”111 This seemingly minor difference in politeness 
caused non-Spanish speaking members in the second group, those rely-
ing solely on the interpreter, to find that the witness’ testimony was less 
convincing, less competent, less intelligent, and less trustworthy.112 On 
the contrary, Spanish speakers who heard the witness’ original, polite 
response found the witness both more convincing and more trustwor-
thy.113 
 There are few, if any, safeguards to prevent these inaccuracies.114 
Even the most experienced and well-trained interpreters inevitably 
make mistakes, but unless another foreign language speaker is in the 
courtroom, an interpreter’s accuracy is subject to virtually no scru-
                                                                                                                      
104 See Shulman, supra note 27, at 176, n.3; Sanders et al., supra note 103, at 65. 
105 See Shulman, supra note 27 at 176. 
106 See, e.g., Hsieh, supra note 29, at 1189; Joanne I. Moore & Ron A. Mamiya, Interpret-
ers in Court Proceedings, in Immigrants in Courts, supra note 7, at 29, 39. In one pivotal 
exchange during a prosecution of two men for rape, the victim was asked, “‘Do you re-
member the day [the defendant] sexually assaulted you?’” See Hsieh, supra note 29, at 
1189. The interpreter rendered the attorney’s question as, “‘Do you remember the day 
[the defendant] made love to you?’” See id. Similarly, in a Washington murder trial, an 
interpreter rendered the statement, “‘I will aim at you,’” as “‘I will kill you.’” See Moore & 
Mamiya, supra, at 39. 
107 See Berk-Seligson, supra note 26, at 169. 
108 See id. at 155, 158. 
109 See id. at 155. 
110 See id. 
111 See id. 
112 See Berk-Seligson, supra note 26, at 165. 
113 See id. at 164. 
114 See Shulman, supra note 27, at 186. 
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tiny.115 The best way to prevent inaccurate interpretation is interpreter 
certification, but few states provide such programs.116 If states are un-
willing to shoulder the burden of ensuring equal access to justice by 
providing qualified interpreters for linguistic minorities, then the judi-
cial system should intervene and empower non-English speaking indi-
viduals to protect themselves against inaccurate interpretation.117 
2. Mixed Signals: Cross-Cultural Communication 
 Words alone do not create understanding.118 Subjects, nouns, and 
verbs strung together as sentences are “merely signs, cues, or hints as to 
what a speaker intends the listener to understand.”119 Because interac-
tion between speakers creates meaning, linguistic communication is 
best understood as a “social process . . . rather than a static code.”120 It 
is a metaphor for culture, and rests on a foundation of assumptions 
that may be similar or starkly different.121 This is particularly evident in 
the legal field: even if a lawyer and her client speak the same language, 
conveying meaning is difficult.122 Thus, contrary to the underlying as-
sumptions of conduit theory, the problems of language difference are 
not susceptible to a mechanical solution.123 “How something is said may 
at times be more important than what is actually said.”124 
 This fact is all the more apparent in light of the tremendous chal-
lenges posed by cross-cultural communication.125 Intonation, pitch, 
                                                                                                                      
115 See Hsieh, supra note 29, at 1187; Shulman, supra note 27, at 186 (“Typically, errors 
in interpretation are corrected only when another interpreter or other courtroom per-
sonnel fluent in that language are present.”). 
116 See Hsieh, supra note 29, at 1187; Moore & Mamiya, supra note 106, at 40. “With the 
exception of the few states that require interpreters to be certified, no state provides judges 
with criteria by which to evaluate an interpreter other than stating that he must be ‘qualified’ 
or ‘competent.’” Shulman, supra note 27, at 179, n.21. Although not as effective, an even 
simpler, more cost-effective solution would be to require the tape recording of all interpreted 
testimony for subsequent review. See Moore & Mamiya, supra note 106, at 40. 
117 See discussion infra Part IV. 
118 See Ahmad, supra note 94, at 1032–33. 
119 Id. at 1033 (footnote omitted). 
120 Id. 
121 See de Jongh, supra note 84, at 288. 
122 See id. at 290 (analyzing the many possible interpretations of the word “charged” in 
the legal context). 
123 See id.; McKeown & Miller, supra note 28, at 41–42; see also David Bellos, Op-Ed., I, 
Translator, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 2010, at A20 (noting that statistical machine translation, 
despite recent improvements, is still wrought with inaccuracies). 
124 de Jongh, supra note 84, at 292. 
125 See Cole & Maslow-Armand, supra note 11, at 195–96; de Jongh, supra note 84, at 
290–91. 
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body language, and nonverbal gestures are not necessarily fungible be-
tween cultures.126 Thus, in monolingual and monocultural courtrooms, 
a fact-finder’s unguided reliance on demeanor evidence based upon 
the conduct of a limited- or non-English speaking individual is danger-
ous.127 A common example of this phenomenon is the gaze pattern.128 
In American culture, “observers impute less credibility to persons who 
avoid eye contact during a conversation.”129 Social science research 
demonstrates, however, that gaze patterns vary among cultures.130 Like 
the Mixtec witness, “when a Haitian witness looks at the floor when 
asked a question by the judge, he or she may not be doing so out of 
guilt but rather as a result of a culturally learned respect for the judge 
as an authority figure.”131 Moreover, one recent study suggests that in-
terpreters can be as harmful as they are helpful in dealing with cross-
cultural communication issues.132 Ultimately, the ability of limited- or 
non-English speaking individuals to present evidence to the court is 
undermined because the failure to engage in accurate cross-cultural 
communication may affect the weight fact-finders assign to the testi-
mony of non-English speaking witnesses.133 
                                                                                                                      
126 See de Jongh, supra note 84, at 290, 292; see also John M. Conley et al., The Power of 
Language: Presentational Style in the Courtroom, 1978 Duke L.J. 1375, 1395 (concluding that 
even “relatively subtle variations in courtroom speaking styles can influence jurors’ reac-
tions and deliberations”). 
127 See Karton, supra note 14, at 29. 
128 See de Jongh, supra note 84, at 292; Neal P. Pfeiffer, Note, Credibility Findings in INS Asy-
lum Adjudications: A Realistic Assessment, 23 Tex. Int’l L.J. 139, 144 (1988); supra note 30. 
129 Pfeiffer, supra note 128, at 144. 
130 See de Jongh, supra note 84, at 292; Pfeiffer, supra note 128, at 144. 
131 de Jongh, supra note 84, at 292. 
132 See Berk-Seligson, supra note 26, at 196 (noting that “the court interpreter in the 
examination of a witness affects the impressions of that witness” and that “perceptions of 
some of the witness’s social/psychological attributes—namely convincingness, truthful-
ness, intelligence, and competence—are affected by pragmatic alterations made by the 
interpreter”). 
133 See Cole & Maslow-Armand, supra note 11, at 195–96. This fact cannot be under-
stated: a recent study comparing Spanish-speaking witnesses’ answers with interpreters’ 
renditions into English concluded that, although the competence of the interpreter was a 
significant factor, “[w]hat is indisputable . . . is that all interpreters tended to omit those 
seemingly unimportant features of speech style that can impinge on the evaluation of wit-
nesses’ speech by those judging them. The interpreter’s stylistically inaccurate renditions 
can therefore potentially alter the outcome of the case.” Sandra Hale, How Faithfully Do 
Court Interpreters Render the Style of Non-English Speaking Witnesses’ Testimonies? A Data-Based 
Study of Spanish-English Bilingual Proceedings, 4 Discourse Stud. 25, 44 (2002). The study 
specifically found that alterations by interpreters tend to be “detrimental to the evaluation 
of witnesses’ character and credibility.” See id. at 43–44. 
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III. Credibility Determinations: The Legacy of the Common Law 
All of us know that, in every-day life, the way a man behaves when he tells a 
story—his intonations, his fidgetings or composure, his yawns, the use of his 
eyes, his air of candor or of evasiveness—may furnish valuable clues to his re-
liability. Such clues are by no means impeccable guides, but they are often 
immensely helpful. So the courts have concluded. 
—Jerome Frank134 
 For nearly three thousand years, jurists have held fast to the notion 
that observing an individual’s demeanor is of the utmost importance in 
the determination of his or her credibility as a witness.135 This principle 
has wound its way through the jurisprudence of nations; in the United 
States, demeanor evidence has been “endowed . . . with precedential 
value to the extent that the concept is reified in both case law and the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.”136 Accordingly, immense discretion has 
been conferred upon fact-finders relying on oral testimony.137 Regard-
                                                                                                                      
134 Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial: Myths and Reality in American Justice 21 
(3rd prtg. 1973). 
135 See NLRB v. Dinion Coil Co., 201 F.2d 484, 487–88 (2d. Cir. 1952) (tracing the his-
tory of demeanor evidence); Frank, supra note 134, at 21; Blumenthal, supra note 41, at 
1158. 
136 Blumenthal, supra note 41, at 1158 (footnotes omitted). 
137 Dinion, 201 F.2d at 488. Regarding in-court interpretation, this discretion has been 
circumscribed by a small degree: in most jurisdictions, jurors are allowed to consider only 
the testimony of a non-English speaking witness rendered by the interpreter into English 
as evidence; they must disregard anything said in the original language. See Hernandez v. 
New York, 500 U.S. 352, 379 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Hsieh, supra note 29, at 1193. 
Moreover, bilingual jurors who speak the same language as the witness are typically in-
structed to disregard all interpreting errors they think may have been made. See William 
E. Hewitt, Court interpretation: Model Guides for Policy and Practice in the 
State Courts 132 (1995). Controversy over the validity of this rule and the fairness of 
allowing bilingual jurors to serve came to a head in Hernandez v. New York, where the Court 
found that a prosecutor’s peremptory strike of a bilingual juror whom the lawyer sus-
pected was unable to rely solely on the interpreter’s English rendering of the testimony 
was a “valid for-cause challenge.” See 500 U.S. at 362–63 (majority opinion). Scholars have 
attacked the basis of this ruling, arguing that scientific evidence and common sense dem-
onstrate that it is inherently impossible for a bilingual juror to turn off one of his or her 
language inputs. See Hsieh, supra note 29, at 1194; see also Juan F. Perea, Buscando 
América: Why Integration and Equal Protection Fail to Protect Latinos, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1420, 
1436 (2004) (“All of the opinions in Hernandez made erroneous assumptions 
about bilinguals. . . . Bilinguals understand and think in two languages simultaneously and 
interdependently; it is how their brains work. The prosecutor in Hernandez was asking the 
impossible when he asked the bilingual jurors to ignore the Spanish-language testimony 
. . . .”). Allowing peremptory strikes in a heavily bilingual area arguably disenfranchises an 
entire ethnic group. See Deborah A. Ramirez, Excluded Voices: The Disenfranchisement of Ethnic 
Groups from Jury Service, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 761, 805. Therefore, at least one scholar pro-
poses allowing bilingual jurors to acknowledge both the original foreign language testi-
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less of accuracy, a fact-finder may choose to weigh the telltale indicators 
of a witness’ veracity more heavily than the testimony itself.138 In the 
mid-1800s, this concept began to take shape as the so-called “province 
of the jury” rule.139 In short, the subject of witness credibility is simply 
off-limits to any trial participant other than the fact-finder.140 Despite 
strong evidence suggesting that the underlying assumptions of the doc-
trine are false, courts “tenaciously cling” to this last outpost of the 
jury.141 The following section details the substance of the province of 
the jury rule, the degree to which the doctrine has been incorporated 
into the Federal Rules of Evidence, and how its theoretical supports 
have been steadily eroded by social science analysis.142 
A. The Province of the Jury: A Legal Landscape 
 An examination of the history of the province of the jury rule re-
veals the maxim’s peculiar relationship to expert opinion testimony and 
suggests that modern courts have expanded the doctrine’s application 
beyond its traditionally narrow scope.143 Originally, “invading the prov-
ince of the jury” referred not to the relationship between the jury and 
witnesses at trial, but rather to the sacred boundary that exists between 
the jury and the judge.144 The maxim continues to be invoked in its tra-
ditional sense where a trial judge improperly rules on issues of fact or an 
appellate court incorrectly overturns a verdict supported by facts in evi-
dence.145 Thus, the scope of the province of the jury rule was initially 
                                                                                                                      
mony and its English interpretation to “enhance the truth-seeking function of the pro-
ceedings, give jurors the full respect and power due their office, and bypass the constitu-
tional thicket of racial discrimination that every strike of a bilingual juror must now at-
tempt to skirt.” Hsieh, supra note 29, at 1199. 
138 See Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 548 (3rd Cir. 1967). 
139 See Simmons, supra note 34, at 1018–19. 
140 See id. at 1021. 
141 See Poulin, supra note 37, at 1001 n.40 (citing numerous cases emphasizing the 
jury’s unique role in making credibility determinations); see also Blumenthal, supra note 41 
at 1192–1203 (comparing the actual physical cues associated with deception with com-
monly perceived ones); Steven I. Friedland, On Common Sense and the Evaluation of Witness 
Credibility, 40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 165, 178–87 (1990) (describing the psychological data 
refuting a juror’s ability to judge a witness’ memory and sincerity); Joseph W. Rand, The 
Demeanor Gap: Race, Lie Detection, and the Jury, 33 Conn. L. Rev. 1, 6–16 (2000) (detailing 
inaccuracies associated with cross-racial credibility determinations). 
142 See infra Part III.A. 
143 Poulin, supra note 37, at 1004–08; Simmons, supra note 34, at 1018–23. 
144 See Simmons, supra note 34, at 1020–21. 
145 See, e.g., Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 340 U.S. 573, 576 (1951) (“[I]t is the 
jury’s function to credit or discredit all or part of the testimony.”); Cole v. Ralph, 252 U.S. 
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limited to the context of “determining the interplay between [a] judge’s 
instructions and the jury’s decisions” regarding matters of credibility, 
and did not touch on the substance of a witness’ actual testimony.146 
 In the United States, Phillips v. Kingfield is regarded as the first ap-
plication of the province of the jury prohibition to the substantive tes-
timony of one witness regarding the credibility of another.147 In Phillips, 
an attorney attempted to elicit from one witness whether “he would 
believe” the testimony of the individual he was called to impeach.148 
The court distinguished testifying to an individual’s reputation for 
truthfulness with a direct opinion on credibility, and held: 
To permit the opinion of a witness, that another witness 
should not be believed, to be received and acted upon by a 
jury, is to allow the prejudices, passions, and feelings of that 
witness, to form, in part at least, the elements of their judg-
ment. To authorize the question to be put, whether the wit-
ness would believe another witness on oath . . . is to depart 
from sound principles and established rules of law respecting 
the kind of testimony to be admitted for the consideration of 
a jury, and their duties in deciding upon it.149 
Thus, the court’s holding broadened the application of the province of 
the jury rule beyond its roots to encompass the witness-jury relation-
ship.150 Fear that the jury will abandon its duty to weigh witness credi-
bility has led courts to apply the reasoning articulated in Phillips aggres-
sively, particularly in the case of expert witnesses.151 As stated by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, most courts find that such testimony 
“would be an invitation for the trier of fact to abdicate its responsibility 
to ascertain the facts relying upon the questionable premise that the 
expert is in a better position to make such a judgment.”152 
                                                                                                                      
286, 302 (1920) (“[T]he evidence presented several disputable questions of fact which it 
was the province of the jury to determine.”). 
146 See Simmons, supra note 34, at 1020 n.40. 
147 See Phillips v. Kingfield, 19 Me. 375, 379 (1841); Simmons, supra note 34, at 1018. 
148 See Phillips, 19 Me. at 375. 
149 See id. at 379. 
150 See id.; Poulin, supra note 37, at 1005; Simmons, supra note 34, at 1020 n.40. 
151 See Poulin, supra note 37, at 1002–03. Interestingly, Wigmore drew an express dis-
tinction between the “province of the jury” to decide facts and the admission of helpful 
expert opinion testimony. See 7 John Henry Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 1917 
(Chadbourn rev. 1978); Simmons, supra note 34, at 1024–25. 
152 Commonwealth v. O’Searo, 352 A.2d 30, 32 (Pa. 1976). In United States v. Johnson, 
the U.S. Supreme Court came to a notably different conclusion. See 319 U.S. 503, 519–20 
(1943). The Court found that the province of the jury rule did not prohibit an expert 
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B. Testimony in Context: The Federal Rules of Evidence 
 Since 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence have governed the ad-
missibility of testimony in federal court.153 The rules favor the admissi-
bility of all relevant evidence and, consistent with this liberal thrust, re-
lax many of the common law restrictions on opinion testimony.154 In 
particular, the rules abandoned the stringent common law require-
ments for the admissibility of expert testimony.155 Rule 702 provides, “If 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert . . . may testify thereto in the form of an 
opinion . . . .”156 In addition, Rule 704 states that “testimony in the form 
of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable 
because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of 
fact.”157 
 Dean Wigmore suggested, “If there is ever devised a psychological 
test for the valuation of witnesses, the law will run to meet it.”158 Fa-
cially, Rules 702 and 704 open the door to expert testimony bearing on 
credibility and invite courts down the path that Wigmore described.159 
                                                                                                                      
from testifying on any particular subject so long as the jury was properly instructed so that 
they could not “possibly have been misled into the notion that they must accept [the opin-
ion].” See id. at 519. The Court concluded: “[W]e ought not to be too finicky or fearful in 
allowing some discretion to trial judges in the conduct of a trial and in the appropriate 
submission of evidence within the general framework of familiar exclusionary rules.” See id. 
at 519–20. Nevertheless, the province of the jury rule’s prohibition on credibility experts is 
well-documented. See Mark S. Brodin, Behavioral Science Evidence in the Age of Daubert: Reflec-
tions of a Skeptic, 73 U. Cin. L. Rev. 867, 916–17 (2005) (citing numerous cases barring 
credibility experts). 
153 See Act to Establish Rules of Evidence for Certain Courts and Proceedings, Pub. L. 
No. 93-595, § 101, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (codified in 28 U.S.C. app.). Since the Federal 
Rules of Evidence were enacted, most of the states have adopted rules of evidence mod-
eled on the Federal Rules. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Silence Speaks Volumes: A Brief 
Reflection on the Question of Whether it Is Necessary or Even Desirable to Fill the Seeming Gaps in 
Article VI of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Governing the Admissibility of Evidence Logically Relevant 
to the Witness’s Credibility, 1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1013, 1017. Therefore, this Note shall focus 
on the federal rules and their relationship to opinion testimony regarding credibility. See 
id. 
154 See Fed. R. Evid. 402; Imwinkelried, supra note 153, at 1019 (“There is only an ink-
ling left of the general rule [against bolstering] in Federal Rule 608(a)(2).”). 
155 Poulin, supra note 37, at 999. 
156 Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
157 Fed. R. Evid. 704. The Advisory Committee characterized the argument that the ul-
timate issue rule prevented witnesses from “usurping the power of the jury” as merely 
“empty rhetoric.” See id. advisory committee’s note. 
158 3a Wigmore, supra note 151, § 875 n.1. 
159 See Poulin, supra note 37, at 1000. 
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Nevertheless, courts persistently raise the province of the jury prohibi-
tion to justify exclusion of this type of expert testimony at trial.160 Thus, 
fact-finders are left to weigh credibility based purely upon their own 
experiences and common sense notions of veracity.161 
C. Debunking the Myth of Demeanor Evidence 
 When expert testimony regarding credibility is excluded pursuant 
to the province of the jury rule, the court necessarily assumes that ju-
rors are adequately equipped to make accurate judgments about indi-
viduals’ truthfulness.162 For centuries, the observation of demeanor 
evidence has been considered critical to this function.163 Moreover, in 
the United States, “physical confrontation, whenever possible, is con-
sidered crucial to the Confrontation Clause.”164 The legal perspective 
presumes that a rational observer knows what to look for in evaluating 
credibility, and that those indicators accurately reflect whether a witness 
is telling the truth.165 Over the last several decades social scientists have 
probed this premise, and a large number of experiments involving 
thousands of subjects have produced clear results: ordinary people pos-
sess no greater capacity for the detection of falsehood than pure 
chance.166 Therefore, continuing to allow unguided reliance on de-
meanor evidence only “promotes faulty judgments and greatly disserves 
                                                                                                                      
160 See id. at 1000–01; Simmons, supra note 34, at 1028. 
161 See Simmons, supra note 34, at 1037. 
162 See Poulin, supra note 37, at 1001. The Supreme Court explicitly reinforced this no-
tion in United States v. Scheffer, where it upheld the exclusion of polygraph evidence in mili-
tary trials. See 523 U.S. 303, 312–13 (1998) (“A fundamental premise of our criminal trial 
system is that ‘the jury is the lie detector.’”). 
163 See Blumenthal, supra note 41, at 1165–66. What attorneys and judges commonly 
call “demeanor” has been broken down by researchers into three channels of communica-
tion: facial expression, body language, and voice. See Rand, supra note 141, at 8; Olin Guy 
Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 1075, 1078 (1991). Paul Ekman and Wallace 
Friesen, pioneers in the field of deception research, developed this model and devised a 
method to analyze each of these channels for cues of deception. See Blumenthal, supra 
note 41, at 1189 (citing Paul Ekman & Wallace V. Friesen, The Repertoire of Nonverbal Behav-
ior: Categories, Origins, Usage, and Coding, 1 Semiotica 49 (1969)). 
164 Blumenthal, supra note 41, at 1182. 
165 Id. at 1193. Reliance on demeanor evidence in the American judiciary extends be-
yond a party’s truthfulness; the prevailing belief is that demeanor is “probative of [a 
party’s] truthfulness and his entire ethos, and can and should be used in determining his 
prospects for rehabilitation or even whether his sentence warrants an increase.” Id. at 
1188–89. 
166 See Wellborn, supra note 163, at 1078–88, 1105 (surveying the extensive history of 
empirical studies examining the ability of lay persons to detect deception or inaccuracy 
through observation of nonverbal behavior). 
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the truth-seeking process.”167 Ignoring this overwhelming evidence 
harms the integrity of the judicial system.168 
 There are three basic misconceptions that undercut any meaning-
ful reliance on demeanor evidence: the sender fallacy, the observer fal-
lacy, and the accuracy fallacy.169 The sender fallacy is the erroneous be-
lief that “an average deceptive speaker will give off certain cues to his 
deception in his physical mannerisms.”170 Years of research have shown 
that there is little support for believing that liars change facial expres-
sion, shift their posture, gesture, or otherwise exhibit the kind of furtive 
movements that have concerned Judge Jerome Frank and much of the 
judiciary for centuries.171 Second, observers tend to focus on the wrong 
cues when evaluating another person’s truthfulness and to ignore those 
that are most important.172 For example, observers tend to attach dee-
per meaning to possible manifestations of nervousness and stress.173 
Lastly, there is the ultimate fallacy of accuracy: experiments have consis-
tently found that observers simply cannot detect deception with any sig-
nificant degree of reliability; most studies conclude that individuals ac-
curately detect deception only forty-five to sixty percent of the time.174 
 This “demeanor gap” widens significantly when jurors confront 
witnesses of different races and cultures.175 The first study of cross-
cultural lie detection involved a comparison of university students from 
the United States and Jordan, and evaluated their relative ability to de-
tect deceit in one another as well as the cues they relied upon when 
                                                                                                                      
167 See Blumenthal, supra note 41, at 1189. 
168 See id. at 1163 (“The integrity of the truth-seeking process is irremediably violated 
when a capricious or even uninformed judgment is made or perpetuated as to how a par-
ticular factor serves the ends of that process.”). 
169 See Rand, supra note 141, at 7–16. 
170 Id. at 11. Studies of these phenomena have developed into the concept known as 
“differential controllability.” See id. Succinctly stated, it is the understanding that liars can 
control the communication channels of facial expression and body language more pre-
cisely than vocal intonation. See Bella M. DePaulo et al., Deceiving and Detecting Deceit, in The 
Self and Social Life 323, 328–29 (Barry R. Schlenker ed., 1985). 
171 See DePaulo et al., supra note 170, at 340; Miron Zuckerman et al., Verbal and Non-
verbal Communication of Deception, in 14 Advances in Experimental Soc. Psychol. 1, 12 
(Leonard Berkowitz, ed., 1981). 
172 See DePaulo et al., supra note 170, at 343–44. 
173 See Zuckerman et al., supra note 171, at 19. This erroneous conclusion has been 
called the “Othello error” because “it is excellently illustrated by Othello’s mistaken inter-
pretation of Desdemona’s distress and despair in response to his accusation of infidelity.” 
Wellborn, supra note 163, at 1080; see also Rand, supra note 141, at 7 n.20. 
174 See Zuckerman et al., supra note 171, at 26. 
175 See Rand, supra note 141, at 4. 
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trying to recognize truthfulness.176 The results of the study were stag-
gering: in the cross-cultural encounters, the accuracy rate for the detec-
tion of deception was less than fifty percent; the observers—both Jor-
danian and American—had a better chance of accurately predicting 
whether their subject was telling the truth by flipping a coin.177 Even 
when subjects were instructed to try and telegraph their deception by 
sending nonverbal cues to their observers, accuracy rates only im-
proved by about two percent.178 The study concluded that these persis-
tent inaccuracies stemmed from the different sets of actual and per-
ceived deception cues in American and Jordanian culture.179 
 Beyond jurors’ inherent inability to evaluate credibility accurately, 
a court’s instructions regarding demeanor evidence may actually in-
crease the likelihood of inaccurate juror evaluations.180 Research has 
shown that when jurors are instructed to presume that a witness is testi-
fying truthfully, as is the common practice, it has the effect of focusing 
jurors on the least reliable indicator of deception: facial expressions.181 
Mock jurors given the equivalent of a common demeanor instruction 
“performed no better than those who were given no instructions at all 
and markedly worse than those who were instructed to focus on vocal 
or paralinguistic cues.”182 When instructed as to paralinguistic charac-
teristics such as tone of voice, however, observers’ abilities to detect de-
ception improved.183 Thus, rather than encouraging the jury to abdi-
cate its fact-finding responsibilities, specific instructions and informa-
tion from a source beyond the province of the jury may actually 
enhance its ability to accurately determine the credibility of witnesses 
presented at trial.184 
                                                                                                                      
176 See Charles F. Bond et al., Lie Detection Across Cultures, 14 J. Nonverbal Behav. 189, 
191 (1990). 
177 See id. at 197. The accuracy rate was higher, though not dramatically so, when ob-
servers viewed subjects from their own culture. See id. at 195. When observing their fellow 
countrymen, American observers had an accuracy rate of 54.9%; Jordanian observers, by 
comparison, correctly gauged truthfulness 57.18% of the time. See id. 
178 See id. at 197. 
179 See id. at 196–97. 
180 See Blumenthal, supra note 41, at 1197. 
181 See id. at 1197–98. 
182 See id. at 1199. 
183 See id. The paralinguistic aspects of communication include “the emotional content 
and background of utterances, as expressed through the speaker’s body language, linguis-
tic style and nuance, pauses, hedges, self-corrections, hesitations, and displays of emotion.” 
Karton, supra note 14, at 24. 
184 See Blumenthal, supra note 41, at 1199. 
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IV. The Expert Witness: Bridging the Gap 
 “[J]uries are composed entirely of untrained observers who receive 
no special instructions regarding lie detection or the misleading aspects 
of demeanor.”185 When linguistic minorities testify, the rift between the 
witness and the fact-finder only widens.186 Although the use of court-
room interpreters is aimed at alleviating some of these difficulties, the 
effect of interpreted testimony can be more detrimental than advanta-
geous.187 Nevertheless, despite sound behavioral studies demonstrating 
the inaccuracies associated with demeanor evidence and the particular 
prejudice it inflicts on non-English speakers, courts continue to cling 
white-knuckled to the province of the jury rule.188 In the words of one 
scholar, “It is unforgivable that the legal system deliberately ignores 
demonstrated, relevant findings . . . and willfully adheres to an ineffec-
tual traditional approach.”189 The roots of the ancient common law 
doctrine are choking off meaningful access to justice without cause; 
therefore, courts should abandon the province of the jury rule and al-
low expert opinion testimony regarding credibility where non-English 
speaking parties or witnesses would otherwise suffer prejudice.190 
A. Factors Favoring the Admissibility of Expert Testimony 
 Expert opinion testimony touching on the credibility of non-
English speaking witnesses falls within the framework established by the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.191 Expert testimony is generally admissible 
so long as it 
will assist the trier of fact to . . . determine a fact in issue . . . 
[and] if (1) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, 
(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and me-
                                                                                                                      
185 See Rand, supra note 141, at 14. 
186 See Cole & Maslow-Armand, supra note 11, at 196; Karton, supra note 14, at 28; 
Rand, supra note 141, at 4. 
187 See Cole & Maslow-Armand, supra note 11, at 195–96; Hsieh, supra note 29, at 1189–
92; Shulman, supra note 27, at 176. 
188 See Poulin, supra note 37, at 1002. 
189 See Blumenthal, supra note 41, at 1204. 
190 See Poulin, supra note 37, at 1068; Rand, supra note 141, at 74; Simmons, supra note 
34, at 1065–66. 
191 See Fed. R. Evid. 702, 704. 
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thods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and me-
thod reliably to the facts of the case.192 
Simply put, the expert’s opinion must be helpful and reliable.193 As 
decades of behavioral research have demonstrated, ordinary jurors 
simply do not have the innate capacity to detect falsehood accurately 
that the legal community consistently attributes to them.194 The conse-
quences of this inadequacy are most acute where cross-cultural com-
munication is required.195 Therefore, where a party offers the testimony 
of a qualified linguist or cultural expert with specialized knowledge of 
cultural behavioral cues relevant to the credibility of a party or witness, 
his or her testimony should be admitted because it is undeniably help-
ful to the trier of fact.196 
 Courts have opened the door to expert witness testimony on issues 
of credibility in the context of eyewitness identification testimony based 
upon a similar rationale.197 For instance, experiments have long shown 
that eyewitness identifications are surprisingly inaccurate, even when 
there is a relatively short lapse of time between initial perception and 
recall.198 Until the 1980s, courts uniformly rejected any attempt by de-
                                                                                                                      
192 Fed. R. Evid. 702. Rule 702 codifies the Supreme Court’s rulings regarding the 
specific requirements for the admissibility of expert testimony. See id. advisory committee’s 
note. Specifically, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Court made trial judges 
the “gatekeepers” of expert testimony by entrusting them with the responsibility for de-
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1995) (identifying Rule 702’s three distinct requirements as helpfulness, qualification, and 
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194 See Wellborn, supra note 163, at 1104. 
195 See Bond et al., supra note 176, at 196–97; Cole & Maslow-Armand, supra note 11, at 
196; Karton, supra note 14, at 28. 
196 See Fed. R. Evid. 702; Rand, supra note 141, at 71–74 (discussing the admissibility of 
expert testimony for cross-racial testimony of African Americans). 
197 See Poulin, supra note 37, at 1028. 
198 See id. at 1030–31. In one experiment, subjects were shown four slides of a “target” 
human face for about thirty seconds. See Kenneth R. Laughery et al., Recognition of Human 
Faces: Effects of Target Exposure Time, Target Position, Pose Position, and Type of Photograph, 55 J. 
Applied Psychol. 477, 477 (1971). After only eight minutes, they were asked to pick out 
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fense attorneys to introduce expert witnesses to testify as to the credibil-
ity of eyewitness identifications, often invoking the province of the jury 
prohibition.199 Over the last several decades, however, courts of appeals 
have generally accepted that, at least in some cases, such testimony is 
indeed helpful to the jury.200 Although expert testimony regarding an 
eyewitness’ credibility is typically allowed only under narrow circum-
stances, one such circumstance is that of cross-racial identification.201 
According to one scholar, “unless we assume that every jury is familiar 
with the psychological experiments and scientific conclusions about 
factors that affect eyewitness reliability, we should conclude that eyewit-
ness reliability experts have something probative to say about nearly 
every eyewitness identification.”202 The factors involved in a jury’s con-
sideration of a non-English speaking witness’ testimony are no differ-
ent: social science research openly refutes the argument that the com-
mon sense of the average juror is so extensive as to include knowledge 
about other cultures’ cues of deception.203 Therefore, as in the case of 
cross-racial identifications, expert testimony should be allowed.204 
B. Addressing Arguments Against Admissibility 
1. Rule 403: Balancing Probative Value Against Prejudice 
 One foreseeable objection to abolishing the province of the jury 
rule regarding matters of credibility is that jurors will give too much 
weight to the expert’s opinion.205 Even if the testimony is probative, 
Rule 403 permits a court to exclude otherwise relevant evidence if “its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair pre-
                                                                                                                      
the individual’s image from an array of 150 photos. See id. Only fifty-two percent of subjects 
were capable of identifying the correct photo. See id. 
199 See Poulin, supra note 37, at 1032. For example, in United States v. Amaral, the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected testimony attacking the credibility of an eyewit-
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determination as to what weight or effect to give to the evidence of the eye-witness.” See 
488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973). 
200 See Poulin, supra note 37, at 1032. 
201 See Simmons, supra note 34, at 1036. 
202 Id. at 1037. 
203 See, e.g., Bond et al., supra note 176, at 196–97. 
204 See Poulin, supra note 37, at 1068; Rand, supra note 141, at 74; Simmons, supra note 
34, at 1065–66. 
205 See Simmons, supra note 34, at 1053. 
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judice.”206 Some courts are concerned that “jurors will be dazzled and 
overpowered by the qualifications of the expert and the scientific sheen 
of the technique and give the testimony more weight than it de-
serves.”207 Again, numerous studies have demonstrated that this fear is 
baseless.208 Even if there is some effect on the jury’s decision making, it 
hardly rises to the “substantial” prejudice required to exclude evidence 
under Rule 403.209 Moreover, excluding this one particular subject, as 
opposed to expert opinion per se, implies that credibility is qualitatively 
different from other topics of expert testimony.210 Like testimony about 
polygraph evidence or eyewitness identification, there is nothing par-
ticularly flashy or awe-inspiring about cultural behavioral cues or lin-
guistics that would likely sway a jury through an improper appeal to 
emotion.211 Testimony of this nature plainly possesses no “aura of infal-
libility” that encourages jurors to relinquish their duty.212 Additionally, 
courts regularly admit expert testimony based on far more complicated 
and technical issues to which jurors must inevitably give substantial 
weight.213 As one scholar summarizes: 
[T]he battle to allow experts to present their opinion in court 
has already been fought . . . . [V]ictory was followed by the 
logical and inexorable (if inconsistent) broadening of that 
ability to every reliable field of expertise; witness credibility is 
simply the last such field that remains to be covered.214 
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Thus, even if a court engages in Rule 403 balancing regarding credibil-
ity testimony by experts, it should conclude that the testimony is admis-
sible.215 
2. Quality Control of Expert Witnesses 
 A second argument against ending the province of the jury prohi-
bition is that it will “open the door to hundreds of different kinds of 
witnesses claiming to be ‘credibility experts’” with no method of dis-
cerning who the real experts are.216 Weeding out experts relying on 
unreliable methods could strain the court’s time and limited re-
sources.217 The concern is legitimate, but the answer is easily contained 
within Rule 702 itself: only individuals with “specialized knowledge” 
based on “skill, experience, training, or education” may render an ex-
pert opinion in court.218 Concerning the specific issue of the credibility 
of non-English speaking witnesses, the burden is on the party offering 
the expert opinion to show that the individual is qualified as an expert 
on linguistics or on a particular culture’s behavior.219 Thus, courts 
would not need to expend needless energy on a searching inquiry.220 
3. The Symbolic Function of Fact-Finding 
 The third and most compelling argument in favor of retaining the 
province of the jury rule is that it “represents the final step of the pro-
fessionalization of fact-finding in our courts.”221 Rather than suggesting 
that jurors will lend too much weight to the expert’s testimony, this ob-
jection suggests that jurors will become entirely disenfranchised from 
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their role in the trial process.222 The Oregon Supreme Court expressed 
this very concern: 
The cherished courtroom drama of confrontation, oral testi-
mony, and cross-examination is designed to let a jury pass 
judgment on [witnesses’] truthfulness and on the accuracy of 
their testimony. The central myth of the trial is that truth can 
be discovered in no better way, though it has long been ar-
gued that the drama really serves symbolic values more im-
portant than reliable fact finding. One of these implicit values 
surely is to see that parties and the witnesses are treated as 
persons to be believed or disbelieved by their peers rather 
than as electrochemical systems to be certified as truthful or 
mendacious by a machine.223 
Advocates desiring to maintain inviolate the province of the jury submit 
that the result of abandoning the rule “is not a trial by peers, but a trial 
by experts (or by machines) that is rubber-stamped by peers.”224 
 This objection is both overly alarmist and overly sentimental.225 
Allowing testimony regarding credibility does not relieve the jury of its 
burden of reconstructing the past or applying the law to the facts of the 
case.226 Although the jury’s role would inevitably be reduced by some 
degree, it is in a capacity in which, by all objective measurement, jurors 
perform poorly.227 Moreover, abandoning this outmoded rule does not 
undercut “the cathartic effect and sense of procedural justice felt by 
parties and victims when their story can be told in a public tribunal.”228 
Given the potentially dire consequences of an adverse judgment on 
credibility—as in the Ventura case—concerns about accuracy and fair-
ness should outweigh the symbolic social benefits afforded by the prov-
ince of the jury prohibition.229 
                                                                                                                      
222 See id. 
223 State v. Lyon, 744 P.2d 231, 240 (Or. 1987) (Linde, J., concurring) (citation omit-
ted). 
224 See Simmons, supra note 34, at 1061. 
225 See id. at 1061, 1063. 
226 See id. at 1062. 
227 See id. 
228 Id. 
229 See Simmons, supra note 34, at 1062. 
192 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 31:163 
Conclusion 
 In the modern multilingual courtroom, linguistic minorities stand 
at a distinct disadvantage compared to English speakers. Unable to 
communicate directly with the trier of fact, non-English speaking wit-
nesses and parties must rely on courtroom interpreters to deliver their 
messages to the jury. Although interpreters are an essential tool for en-
suring at least a modicum of fairness at trial, the inadequacies associ-
ated with courtroom interpretation are considerable. Misinterpretation 
is common, and even seemingly innocuous alterations have a demon-
strable impact on trial participants. Simple errors in vocabulary and 
syntax are compounded with the inevitable problems associated with 
cross-cultural communication and the misapprehension of behavioral 
cues. As research has shown, the already mediocre ability of jurors to 
make accurate assessments of witnesses’ credibility decreases dramati-
cally when the speaker is from a different culture. 
 The prejudice faced by linguistic minorities in the multilingual 
courtroom is only further enhanced by courts’ reluctance to abandon 
the archaic province of the jury rule. The prohibition rests on an un-
supported premise that jurors are adequately equipped to make credi-
bility determinations without outside assistance. Countless studies have 
demonstrated that ordinary jurors are simply unable to make an accu-
rate assessment of a witness’ credibility in any consistent manner. Ex-
pert opinion testimony touching on the credibility of non-English 
speaking witnesses would particularly assist the trier of fact and falls eas-
ily within the boundaries established by the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
Therefore, courts should abandon their strict application of the prov-
ince of the jury rule and allow expert opinion testimony regarding cre-
dibility in order to ensure fundamental fairness at trial for linguistic 
minorities. 
